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VIOLATING THE INVIOLABLE: FIREARM
INDUSTRY RETROACTIVE EXEMPTIONS
AND THE NEED FOR A NEW TEST FOR
OVERREACHING FEDERAL PROHIBITIONS
JAMES L. DANIELS*
"It is our number one priority."'
- Lawrence Keane, VP and GC of the National Shooting Sports
Foundation, on the reintroduction of the Protection of Legal
Commerce in Arms Act in 2005.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario: a TNT manufacturer receives
a call from a shady munitions dealer, who says that he needs to fill
an order for several tons of TNT immediately. When asked about
the last shipment of explosives that was sent to him, the dealer
explains that he "lost" it. Now he needs more. As the TNT
manufacturer considers this, he checks his customer database and
sees that more than half of the major terrorist acts committed in
the last few years are somehow linked to the dealer. The
manufacturer agrees to the deal, and ships off the TNT.
It requires no great leap of the imagination to picture the
ensuing catastrophe. What would strain the imagination is the
final outrage: that after the dust settles and the dead are taken
away, the public discovers that the TNT manufacturer is
completely immunized from all lawsuits due to a recently passed
congressional act.
A. FirearmIndustry Retroactive Exemptions
This scenario, though fictional, is anything but far-fetched.
The irresponsible marketing procedures described above occur

* James Daniels graduated from the John Marshall Law School with a
J.D. in 2005. The author thanks Professors Michael P. Seng and Susan Marie
Connor for their valuable help and guidance. He also gratefully acknowledges
his parents for their unflagging support, and Aasne and Willa for acts above
and beyond the call of duty.
1. Sue Reisinger, High Noon, available at http'//www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1098891006017 (Oct. 29, 2004). See text accompanying infra
note 63 (describing the differences between the old and new bills).
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every day whenever gun manufacturers knowingly supply
weapons to unreliable Federal Firearms Licensees, who then sell
them to criminals and their agents. Such transactions will soon
be granted blanket immunity if the 109th Congress passes a
firearm industry retroactive exemption such as 2004's unenacted
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act ("PoLCAA"). 3
Retroactive firearm industry exemptions such as PoLCAA are
something new under the sun. They are nationwide congressional
prohibitions that would strip away vital and long-held state
powers in order to protect the profits of a single industry, without
replacing these powers with any augmented federal regulatory
scheme.4
B. Comment Organization
Part II of this Comment will describe the favored status that
the gun industry enjoys in our society, and will reveal the
industry's irresponsible design and marketing practices. Three
arguments follow, suggesting ways in which firearm industry
retroactive exemptions might be found unconstitutional: first, in
Part III.B, because acts like PoLCAA are procedurally unsound
and are proposed with insufficient fact-finding; second, in Part
III.C, because such acts purposefully commandeer state executive
officers in defiance of established precedent; and third, in Part IV,
because even if such acts are generally applicable to both private
and public actors alike, they nevertheless excessively interfere
with the functioning of state governments and therefore should
trigger a balancing test suggested-but never yet applied-by the
Supreme Court.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Protected Status of the Gun Trade
The gun trade is the fortunate son of American industry.5
Due to the lobbying efforts of powerful special interest groups such
as the National Rifle Association ("NRA"), gun manufacturers

2. Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How City Lawsuits Can
Help Reform an IrresponsibleGun Industry, 11 J.L. & POLY 67, 108-10 (2002).
3. Rhonda McMillion, ABA Opposes Gun Bill, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2003, at 63.

4. Letter from Alan B. Morrison, Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group,
to Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, United States Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (July 24, 2003), available at http://www.publiccitizen.org/
documents/Letter.pdf [hereinafter Morrison Letter] (last visited May 24,

2005).
5. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 68.
6. See PETER HARRY BROWN & DANIEL G. ABEL, OUTGUNNED: UP AGAINST
THE NRA 31-48 (2003) (describing the structure, mission, and leadership of the
NRA). The NRA has been described as "the most powerful organization in the
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have been granted special exemptions from civil liability that
practically no other industry has enjoyed.7 In 1972, Congress
specifically excluded gun manufacturers from the Consumer
Product Safety Act,8 so that not even guns with acknowledged
defects need to be pulled off the market.9 Fourteen years later, the
gun industry was further shielded by the McClure-Volkmer
Firearms Owners Protection Act ("FOPA")," which did much to
take the bite out of the Gun Control Act of 1968.11
Even so, the gun industry frequently refers to itself as
"friendless"" and "heavily regulated."" But federal regulations are
minimal at best. For example, the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1994" requires only a five-day waiting period
between firearms purchases," a background check to weed out
inappropriate purchasers such as felons and juveniles, 6 and a
database of purchasers' names."
Federal oversight is otherwise very limited. 8 The Bureau of
United States" by both Forbes and Fortune magazines. Id. at 19, 296-97. See
also TOM DIAz, MAKING A KILLING 65 (1999) (naming and describing other
firearm advocacy organizations).
7. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 68.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (a)(1)(B), (E) (2000).
9. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Torts: Defining a
Cause of Action for Victims in Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 115, 130 (2002). See also DIAZ, supra note 6, at 55 (describing, by way of
example, a defective Ruger handgun).
10. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986).
11. Philip J. Cook et al., The Illegal Supply of Firearms, 2002 CRIME &
JUST. 319, 321 (2002). FOPA repealed the ban on out-of-state purchases of
rifles and shotguns instituted by the Gun Control Act of 1968. Id. It also
prohibited the creation of a national registry of firearms, and gave licensed
dealers the right to sell guns outside their shop premises and at gun shows.
Id. at 322. It also allowed convicted felons to purchase firearms under certain
circumstances, struck down the ATF's quantitative, bright line rule that a
dealer is one who sells more than five guns per year, and changed dealer
record-keeping sanctions from felonies to misdemeanors. Id. at 322-24, 347.
See also DIAZ, supra note 6, at 37, 47-48 (describing the Gun Control Act of
1968 and FOPA).
12. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 91.
13. S. 659, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003). See also DIAZ, supra note 6, at 36, 193
(demystifying the NRA's statistics).
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-931. See also Eggen & Culhane, supra note 9, at 12829 (stating that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, because of its
limited scope, is unable to fill the gun trade's "regulatory vacuum").
15. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 72. See also Cook et al., supra note 11, at
343-44 n.8 (revealing that the waiting period required by the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act was replaced by the inferior National Instant Check
System, and also that the Brady Act's effectiveness may be undermined
generally by the pervasive and unmonitored "secondary market" in firearms).
16. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 72.
17. Id.
18. Eggen & Culhane, supra note 9, at 130. See also DIAZ, supra note 6, at
12-13, 30, 42-43, 193-94, 199 (describing the current "anemic" enforcement of
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Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") may only perform one
unannounced visit per year to Federal Firearms Licensees
("FFLs), "9 and has far too few resources to fully investigate the
dealings of all FFLs and gun manufacturers. 0 When the ATF does
discover violations, it takes on average five years to revoke a
federal firearms license.2
Furthermore, firearms transactions
between non-licensed dealers are completely unregulated.'
Lastly, more than twenty states have granted gun
manufacturers blanket immunity from civil liability;' twenty more
have granted qualified immunity.
No other industry, save
tobacco, has been so blessed,' and with the fall of the tobacco
industry in the early 1990s, the gun trade stands alone as
America's last untouchable industry.'
B. The High Toll of Guns, and Industry Culpability
This regulatory vacuum is all the more amazing given the

federal firearm restrictions).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B)(ii)(I).
20. Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry:A Roadmap for
Reforming Gun Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. LOuIS U. PUB. L. REV. 247, 290
n. 125 (1999) (quoting ATF Director Steve Higgins as saying that due to lack of
manpower, the ATF is only able to cover a "minute percent" of gun shows).
See also NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
("ATF personnel are well trained and motivated, but inhibited by lack of
resources and other limitations from flly enforcing the law... this is
particularly true of prosecutions for.., acts of corrupt dealers.").
21. See Kristin Loiacono, Gun Bill Has Opponents up in Arms, TRIAL, June
2003, at 11 (quoting John Vince, former chief of the Firearms Division of the
ATF, as explaining the ATF's difficulty in revoking an FFL's license, and
saying that "[i]f this bill passes a bloodbath will start").
22. See Brian J. Siebel, The Case Against the Gun Industry, 115 PUB.
HEALTH. REP. 410, 413 (2000) (specifying that there are two ways that
firearms are distributed: a primary market, which is any transaction involving
a licensed actor, and the secondary market, which involves all transactions
between unlicensed buyers and sellers). See also Eggen & Culhane, supra
note 9, at 128 (stating that in 1994 primary transactions accounted for
approximately sixty percent of firearms sales, and secondary transactions for
forty percent). The Brady Act has no control over secondary transactions.
Eggen & Cuhane, supra note 9, at 129.
23. See Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 94 n.96 (listing the following states as
granting some form of blanket immunity: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Missouri, and New Hampshire). See also Eggen &
Culhane, supra note 9, at 128 ("[The patchwork of laws on the federal, state,
and local levels fails to limit many of the acts and transactions that lead
directly to gun violence."). See also H.R. REP. NO. 108-59, at 16 n.108 (2003)
(listing state preemptions).
24. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 94 n.96.
25. Eggen & Culhane, supra note 9, at 155-59.
26. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 96.
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pervasiveness of guns" and the heavy toll they take upon the
nation each year. An average of 30,000 people die annually from
gunshot wounds,' and between 60,00029 and 84,000"0 more are
injured. When a handgun is kept in the home, use of the handgun
for suicide is eleven times more likely than use of the handgun to
injure or kill in self defense."' Further, firearm
injuries and deaths
32
cost the country about $20 billion every year.
The gun industry has exacerbated the situation in recent
years by designing and marketing weapons of ever-increasing
lethality and ever-diminishing utility,' which are not fit for
competition, sport, 4 or collection.35 The gun industry has also
neglected to design guns with appropriate safety features such as
external, internal, or high-tech safety locks, which would make the
guns useless if stolen by criminals or found by children.36 Most

27. See Cook et al., supra note 11, at 319, 325 (reporting that that there are
200 million privately owned guns in the United States, 70 million of which are
handguns). Thirty-six percent of U.S. households contain an average of 4.4
guns. Id. at 325. Every year, as the number of firearms in the United States
goes up, the number of firearms owners goes down. DIAz, supra note 6, at 11,
183.
28. Siebel, supra note 22, at 410.
29. Id.
30. Linda Gunderson, The FinancialCosts of Gun Violence, 131 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 483, 483 (1999).
31. Siebel, supra note 22, at 416.
32. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 72. See also Cook et al., supra note 11, at
347 (quoting one estimate that puts the damage at $80 billion per year); DIAZ,
supra note 6, at 10 (quoting an amazing $112 billion estimate).
33. BROWN & ABEL, supra note 6, at 55. See also Eggen & Culhane, supra
note 9, at 124-25 (using as an example the TEC-9, a military-style semiautomatic assault weapon that is "useless for hunting, other kinds of
recreational shooting, or self-defense because of [its] inaccuracy and danger to
the shooter"). One nationally recognized firearms expert described the TEC-9
as "mass produced mayhem." Id. at 125. See also BROWN & ABEL, supra note
6, at 272 (describing what made the TEC-9 the "assault weapon most
preferred by criminals"); id. at 157 (listing the top ten crime guns in 1997);
DIAZ, supra note 6, at 91-105, 134-40, 166, 183 (stating that ongoing
innovations in lethality such as concealable "pocket rockets" or "black talon"
bullets are the result of an increasingly static gun market).
34. BROWN & ABEL, supra note 6, at 157.
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(13) (defining a federally licensed "collector" as
one who deals in "firearms as curios or relics"). Such "collectors" are for all
purposes indistinguishable from FFLs. DIAZ, supra note 6, at 47. See also
BROWN & ABEL, supra note 6, at 96-97 (describing how one such "collector"
sold a TEC-9 to Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, who used it to commit the
Columbine massacre).
36. Siebel, supra note 22, at 411-12. See also Cook et al., supra note 11, at
326 (stating that firearms thefts account for a large portion of illegal
diversions, and that in 1995 there were 269,000 such incidents and over
500,000 guns stolen); Siebel, supra note 24, at 416 (stating that
"approximately one child is killed, and thirteen more are injured, in
unintentional shootings each day," and that "34% of handgun owners keep
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guns also lack chamber indicators.37
Furthermore, some
manufacturers have built and advertised features which would
only appeal to criminals: shallow serial numbers that can easily be
filed off to prevent tracing, 8 fingerprint-proof handles,39 and mailorder assembly kits meant to circumvent statutes that bar
interstate transport of certain guns. '
Lastly, many firearm manufacturers engage in irresponsible
distribution practices such as market saturation, 4' and
undiscerningly supply weapons to scofflaw dealers 2 who openly
allow straw purchases,' multiple sales," and frequent seepage ' of

their guns loaded and unlocked").
37. See Siebel, supra note 22, at 412 (stating that a simple device indicating
whether a firearm was loaded could prevent hundreds of accidental shootings
every year).
38. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 111.
39. Siebel, supra note 22, at 416.
40. Eggen & Culhane, supra note 9, at 126-27. See also DIAZ, supra note 6,
at 194 (describing how gun manufacturers intentionally market to criminals).
41. See City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 21 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2003) (alleging that firearm manufacturers and distributors "knowingly
oversupply or 'saturate' the market with their products in areas where gun
control law[s] are less restrictive, knowing that persons will bring them into
the jurisdictions where they are illegal and then illegally possess or resell
them"). See also Siebel, supra note 22, at 414 (recounting how "the industry
deliberately targets areas with lax gun control laws, knowing that guns
purchased there will be trafficked into states and cities with tougher gun
laws"); David Kairys, The Origin and Development of the Governmental
Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1172-73 (2000) (stating that gun
manufacturers target areas known for easy access to locales with stricter gun
regulations, such as the 1-95 corridor, which fuels the illicit gun trade in New
York and New Jersey); BROWN & ABEL, supra note 6, at 52 (stating that
ninety percent of crime guns recovered in New York are imported from
southern states).
42. See Siebel, supra note 22, at 414 (describing a sting operation conducted
by the City of Chicago to catch twelve such scofflaw dealers). In each case a
two-person team of undercover agents entered the premises and requested to
purchase a firearm, despite the fact that their identification showed that they
resided in Chicago, where it has been illegal to own a handgun since 1982. Id.
In each case the dealer sold firearms to the agents, one even advising them
how to avoid federal paperwork, and another admitting that the sale was
"highly illegal." Id.
43. See Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 108 (defining straw purchasers as "nonprohibited purchasers who fill out the paperwork and complete a firearm sales
transaction, then hand the weapon over to a prohibited purchaser, such as a
felon or minor"). One gun trafficker testifying at a congressional hearing
claimed that he would skirt federal multiple-purchase restrictions at gun
shows by "basically point[ing] out the types of handguns that these straw
purchasers would buy right in front of the gun dealers, and most of them
didn't even pay any attention to me." Id. at 109. See also Cook et al., supra
note 11, at 335-37 (stating that, in a survey of 1,530 investigations involving
84,000 guns, "[n]early half' of the investigations involved guns trafficked by
straw purchasers). Such purchasers were often friends or relatives of the
prohibited purchaser. Id. See also BROWN & ABEL, supra note 6, at 95-101,
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product. '
130-36 (describing the straw purchases that armed the Columbine killers and
the perpetrators of two other high-profile massacres).
44. See Bhomik, supra note 2, at 106-07 (defining multiple sales as "any
transaction involving more than one handgun to a single purchaser or several
sales of guns to an individual purchaser over a five-day period"). Such
transactions are legal, but require a form to be filled out and sent to the ATF.
Id. at 107. See also Cook et al., supra note 11, at 334 (explaining that, despite
their legality, ATF trace data reveals that firearms sold in multiple sales are
much more likely to wind up in criminals' hands); David Kairys, The
Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of
PublicNuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1183-84 (2000) (stating that the
firearm industry "tries to avoid the significance of straw and multiple
purchasers, the primary suppliers for the crime market, by labeling them
'collectors'").
45. See Siebel, supra note 22, at 414 (defining "seepage" as a willful fueling
of the firearms black market by "thousands of unsupervised Federal Firearms
Licensees"). The Bushmaster Rifle used by the Washington D.C. snipers was
traced to Bull's Eye Shooter Supply in Tacoma, Washington. Loiacono, supra
note 21, at 11-12. The store had no explanation as to how it had been acquired
by the snipers, and admitted that more than 200 more guns were missing as
well. Id. See also Cook et al., supra note 11, at 336 (stating that while corrupt
FFLs accounted for nine percent of ATF investigations, their transactions
accounted for almost half the guns investigated). Common FFL violations
include "off paper" sales, false entries in record books, transfers to prohibited
persons, illegal out-of-state transfers, and obliterated serial numbers. Id. In
2000, an ATF compliance inspection of 1,012 licensed dealers revealed that
202 of them had gaps in their records amounting to 13,271 missing guns. Id.
at 341. Of those 202 dealers, 16 had more than 200 missing firearms. Id. See
also Kairys, supra note 41, at 1172 (stating that guns reported missing are
"stolen less frequently than the industry would lead us to believe").
46. See Loiacono, supra note 21, at 11 (quoting former gun industry lobbyist
Robert Ricker as saying that "[o]nly 1 to 1.5 percent of dealers are bad apples.
But they represent about 20 percent of the sales in the United States"). See
also Kairys, supra note 41, at 1167 (citing ATF statistics that show that 1.2%
of the gun dealers are responsible for 57% of the guns traced to crimes).
Instead of investigating or regulating such dealers, the gun industry has
disclaimed all responsibility, and by taking a "head-in-the-sand" approach,
continues to supply guns indiscriminately. Id. at 1165. The manufacturers,
moreover, are fully aware that certain dealers are feeding the criminal market
because for every crime gun recovered by law enforcement, the ATF conducts a
trace. Id. at 1166. The first step in such a trace is to contact the
manufacturer of the gun and use the serial number to discover which dealer
sold it, and to whom. Id. Between 1995 and 2000, the ATF conducted
approximately 800,000 of these traces, an "extraordinary level of direct notice"
to the gun industry of which dealers were fueling firearms into the illegal
market. Id. The full scope of the trace data notice was revealed for the first
time in the findings of AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d at 503, where the court
ordered the ATF to divulge, under the aegis of a protective order, unexpunged
trace data previously unavailable to the public. See also Dep't of the Treasury
v. City of Chicago, 287 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming that the ATF
must surrender its unexpunged trace data to the City of Chicago under the
Freedom of Information Act, to assist in the City's lawsuit against the gun
industry); 5 U.S.C. § 522 (Appropriations Bill) (denying the ATF any funds it
would need to comply with the FOIA disclosures ordered in the
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C. City Suits and the Emergence of the Public Nuisance Claim
In 1998, New Orleans became the first city to bring suit
against gun manufacturers for such abuses.47 Over the next five
years, thirty-two more cities and municipalities followed suit in a
common attempt to recoup their financial losses and force the
industry to adopt safer standards.' To achieve this end, various
cities tried various traditional torts, with little success.'
The City of Chicago, however, took a new approach 0 in
November of 1998 by bringing a public nuisance51 claim against
The city claimed that, by irresponsibly
the gun industry."
marketing and distributing their products, the industry had
created and maintained an illegal market for gun trafficking in
Chicago." The claim was dismissed in circuit court. The appellate
court reversed only to have the Illinois Supreme Court reverse

aforementioned case); DOJ v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1229 (2003) (vacating
the Seventh Circuit opinion and remanding the matter to be reconsidered at
the lower court levels, in light of the last-minute appropriations bill); City of
Chicago v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 384 F.3d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the appropriations bill created no repeal by implication, and that
the ATF must divulge the data in question); City of Chicago v. United States
Dep't of Treasury, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 28002, No. 01-2167 (7th Cir. Dec. 21,
2004) (granting the ATF's petition for rehearing en banc, in light of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005).
47. Annie Tai Kao, Note, A More Powerful Plaintiff.State Public Nuisance
Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 212, 213 (2002).
See also BROWN & ABEL, supra note 6, at 1-6 (describing how the New Orleans
suit was set into motion by the murder of gospel singer Raymond Miles).
48. Kao, supra note 47, at 213.
49. See Eggen & Culhane, supra note 9, at 136-41 (stating that plaintiffs
bringing product liability suits argued that handguns were inherently
defective, but the courts dismissed such claims, finding that weapons used in
crimes operate exactly as intended). City plaintiffs brought strict liability
suits as well, in which they argued that the manufacture and marketing of
handguns is an abnormally dangerous activity. Id. at 150. These, too, were
dismissed, because the courts found that the third party criminal use of the
weapons was what made them abnormally dangerous, not the industry's
manufacture and marketing practices. Id. at 150-54. Likewise, claims against
manufacturers for negligent marketing and negligent entrustment foundered
on the element of proximate cause, because the relationship between gun
manufacturers and criminals was deemed too remote. Id. at 142-50.
50. Kao, supra note 47, at 214.
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979) (defining a
public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public"). This interference must be of a continuing or long-lasting
nature, and the actor must know or have reason to know of it. Id. See also
Kao, supra note 47, at 214 (clarifying that the right implicated in the
governmental lawsuits is the public's right to health and safety). The
interference is the gun industry's irresponsible design, marketing, and
distribution of firearms to the public. Id.
52. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d at 20.
53. Id. at 20-21.
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again and affirm the circuit court's original dismissal.'
Despite this reversal, the public nuisance claim is in fact wellsuited for the gun industry. 5 This tort, which is meant to be
exercised by a government official,' seeks a remedy for conduct
which, although legal, nonetheless endangers the health and
welfare of the general public. 7 As such, it applies squarely to
certain irresponsible marketing and distribution practices utilized
by the gun industry, and has been adopted by all governmental
suits against the gun industry since 1998.58
Buttressed by persuasive statistics and the testimony of
industry whistleblowers,59 six public nuisance city suits have
avoided dismissal on appellate review.'
In addition, Smith &
Wesson, the largest gun company in the industry, finally settled
several suits by agreeing to amend its business practices.6' With
such successes raising the specter of widespread industry
settlement and tobacco-sized payouts, the gun industry has
54. Id. at 31; City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099,
1126 (Ill. 2004).
55. Kairys, supra note 41, at 1173.
56. Id. See also Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving
the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 766 (2001)
(explaining that a non-governmental individual may bring a public nuisance
action if his or her injury is different in kind from the injury suffered by the
public at large); AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (holding that the gun
industry had irresponsibly conducted business so as to endanger the New York
public, but that the NAACP had failed to prove that the harm done to its
members and potential members was different in kind to that suffered by New
Yorkers at large).
57. Antolini, supra note 56, at 766.
58. Kao, supra note 47, at 214-15.
59. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 120. The willful blindness of the industry
has been confirmed by whistleblowers such as Robert Hass, ex-Senior VicePresident of Marketing and Sales for Smith & Wesson, who stated that "the
black market in handguns is not simply the result of stolen guns but is due to
the seepage of guns into the illicit market from multiple thousands of
unsupervised federal handgun licensees." Id.
60. Lawsuits brought by the cities of Chicago, Cincinnati, Newark,
Camden, Jersey City, and Gary have all survived motions to dismiss at the
appellate level. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d at 35; City
of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002); City of
Newark v. Arms Tech., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. 2003); Camden County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000); City of
Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003). The City of Boston's
suit survived an initial motion to dismiss, and the gun industry settled soon
afterwards. Boston v. Smith & Wesson, No. 99-2590, 2002 WL 340183261, at
*18 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2000).
61. Siebel, supra note 22, at 415. See also Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 12831 (describing the Smith & Wesson settlement, in which the manufacturer
agreed to review distributor and dealer behavior for negligence, and devote
two percent of its revenue to creating, within three years, personalization
technology that would allow a firearm to recognize its owner and also
describing Smith & Wesson's subsequent "pariah" status in the industry).
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mobilized to achieve its one remaining hope-a congressional
command absolving the industry of all civil liability.2 PoLCAA
was the most recent result of that mobilization, and although it
was defeated in the Senate in February of 2004, the Act will serve
as a useful template for future firearm industry retroactive
exemptions because of its success in the House of Representatives,
and because the NRA has vowed to sponsor identical legislation in
the future.'
D. The Protectionof Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
PoLCAA states that no civil action may be brought against
gun or ammunition manufacturers, distributors, or dealers unless
it is
1.

an action brought against a transferor convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 924(h), or a comparable or identical state felony
law, by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which the
transferee is so convicted;"

2.

an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment

3.

an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified
product knowingly and willfully violated a state or federal
statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product,
and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for
which relief is sought;6

4.

an action for breach of contract or warranty in connection

or negligence per se;65

62. See Loiacono, supra note 21, at 11 ("The language of the bill is designed
specifically to eliminate lawsuits filed by cities and counties against the
firearms industry.").
63. Id.; Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Senate
(Mar. 2,
2004),
down Immunity
for Gun Industry
Votes
(last visited
http://www.bradycampaign.org/press/release.php?release=548
May 24, 2005); Dave Workman, Senate Kills Amended Industry Lawsuit Bill,

http://www.gunweek.com/2004/659-0320.html. (Mar. 20, 2004).
64. S. 659, 108th Cong. § 4. The version of PoLCAA currently under
consideration by the 109th Congress (House Bill 800 and Senate Bill 397) is
nearly identical to last year's version. See S. 659, 108th Cong., available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?cl09:l./temp/-clO9CfO4hq:: (last visited
May 30, 2005). Two phrases were cut and fifteen more were added, none of
which affect the essential machinery of the bill. Id. This latest incarnation is
in fact particularly well-suited to this Comment because of the new Act's
express invocation of the principles of federalism and the separation of powers.
Id. § 2(a)(8), (b)(6). It also contains not one but two assertions that the Second
Amendment bestows upon non-militia-members the constitutional right to
bear arms. Id. § 2(a)(1)-(2). The most alarming addition, however, is the
insertion of the phrase "or injunction" in the list of actions that a court may
not henceforth take against the gun industry. Id. § 4(5)(A).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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with the purchase of the product;6 7 or
5.

an action for physical injuries or property damage resulting
directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the
product, when used as intended.6

Of these five exceptions, four are moot: exceptions one and
three only allow actions against industry actors that commit
felonies, and exceptions four and five only allow actions for breach
of warranty or manufacturing defects.'
None of the exceptions
pertain to the thirty-three negligence and public nuisance city
suits brought against gun manufacturers, which focused mainly on
irresponsible, though legal, industry behavior.
Then there is exception number two, which states that sellers
may be held liable for negligent entrustment or negligence per se. 0
This is a safe concession on the gun industry's part, because such
dealers (many of whom would be judgment proof") could only be
held liable if they directly sold firearms to the criminals
themselves. 2
What exception number two does not say, however, is that
manufacturers may be held liable for negligent entrustment as
well as dealers. This is a key point, because the thrust of all city
and municipal suits is that gun manufacturers are fully aware
that a few "bad apple" dealers-one percent of all dealers
nationwide-provide almost sixty percent of the weapons traced to
crimes, and yet the industry does nothing to regulate them.73 By

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 99-108 (providing a clause-byclause analysis of PoLCAA's demerits).
70. S. 659, 108th Cong. § 4.
71. See Kairys, supra note 41, at 1169 (explaining that many FFLs are
"kitchen-table" or "car-trunk" dealers: small time operators without stores who
sell guns privately or at gun shows). See also Cook et al., supra note 11, at
324-25 (reporting that between 1975 and 1992, the number of FFLs increased
from 161,927 to 284,117, an estimated forty-six percent of which "were not
actively engaged in a firearms business"). A survey taken in 1998, when
measures taken by the Clinton Administration had substantially reduced the
number of FFLs, nonetheless revealed that thirty-one of licensed gun retailers
had not sold a single firearm in the past twelve months. Id.
72. See Loiacono, supra note 21, at 11 (quoting John Conyers, House
Judiciary Committee ranking member, as pointing out that the bill narrowly
defines negligent entrustment so as to make sellers liable for primary
transactions, but not secondary ones-thus exempting them from liability for
all sales to gun traffickers).
73. One study found that 1.2% of dealers are responsible for 57% of crimegun traces. Kairys, supra note 41, at 1167. The allegations in Camden
County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. are typical:
[Defendants] continually use distribution channels that they know
regularly yield criminal and underage end users in Camden County and
throughout the nation. In many cases they have been specifically so
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not acknowledging industry responsibility to reasonably design
and market its products and monitor its distribution chains,
PoLCAA would have not only retroactively killed all pending
litigation currently in the courts,7 ' but it also would have
prevented any such city, state, or municipal actions from ever
being brought again.75
Unique in purpose,
This is an enormous proposition.
unprecedented in scope, such exemptions would effectively
amputate a vital limb of state common law and set a dangerous
precedent."
III.

ANALYZING

PoLCAA's

PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE MERITS

A. Introduction
PoLCAA was lacking both procedurally and substantively."
Its rushed congressional hearing, lopsided construction and utter
disregard for precedent made it a uniquely dangerous act, which
would have created a regulatory vacuum that excessively
interfered with state regulatory powers.78 The Act, and any future
exemption like it, is thus defective, overreaching, and ultimately
unconstitutional.79
B. ProceduralDefects: Lack of CongressionalFact-Finding
Within the last ten years,
increasing willingness to strike
which are not supported by
congressional record." PoLCAA

the Supreme Court has shown
down as unconstitutional acts
sufficient fact-finding in the
was a prime candidate for such

informed in connection with crime-gun trace efforts by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
("ATF").
Kairys, supra note 44, at 1179 n.16. See also Cook et al., supra note 11, at
334-36 (quoting a survey of 1,530 cases involving 84,000 diverted guns, which
revealed that half of all traces can be traced to just 0.4% of licensed dealers,
and that such corrupt FFLs are "[almong the largest traffickers").
74. Loiacono, supra note 21, at 11.
75. Id.
76. See Morrison Letter, supra note 4, at 3 ("[I1f Congress could preempt
state common law in this instance, it would seem to have no impediment to
eliminating any aspect of state tort law... without providing a federal
program or remedy to replace it.").
77. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. See also infra note 129
and accompanying text.
78. See infra Part III.C.3 through Part IV.A.
79. See infra Part IV.B.
80. A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress:
The Supreme Court's New "on the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal
Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 328, 329-30 (2001). See also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zone Act
was unconstitutional, partly because nowhere in the legislative history of the
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treatment because of its brief, contentious hearing"1 and the farfetched House Report that followed.82
1.

The Hearing
PoLCAA's congressional record is both scanty and suspect.3
Despite its far-reaching implications and novel scope, PoLCAA, in
its House incarnation as House Bill 1037, was given only a single
legislative hearing before the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law on April 2, 2003, one day before its markup in
the Full Committee on the Judiciary.'
There were only five
speakers.' Two were late, and one submitted his testimony less
than an hour before the hearing began.'
The proceedings of the Full Committee markup on the
following day were even more questionable. On April 3, 2003,
after several ranking members had spoken for and against the bill,
and after a majority member's amendment had been withdrawn, 7
ranking minority member Mr. Watts asked that his suggested
amendment,' which ran a little over one page, 8 be read in its

Act was there enough evidence to support the contention that the possession of
guns in the vicinity of school grounds substantially affected interstate
commerce); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) (ruling that
legislative record of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act failed to
persuasively show a widespread pattern of state age discrimination); Turner
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 623, 636 (1994) (ruling as unconstitutional
the "must carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, while dismissing three years of congressional dictate
as "mere conjecture" of "supposed harms"); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 629 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority, in
striking down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, was dismissing four
years of hearings and eight separate reports); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377-78 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that, by
ruling that the congressional findings did not demonstrate a pattern of
disability discrimination on behalf of the states, the majority dismissed a "vast
legislative record" presented in thirteen congressional hearings, collected by a
special task force that held "hearings in every State, attended by more than
30,000 people").
81. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 97-98.
82. Id.
83. See supra Parts III.A to III.B.
84. H.R. REP. NO. 108-59, at 97.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 58-60 (statement of Mr. John Conyers, Jr., ranking member,
House Committee on the Judiciary) (suggesting, facetiously, that House Bill
1036 be amended so as to exempt all users of firearms, in addition to
manufacturers). Mr. Conyers was later ruled out of order for soliciting the
advice-on the record-of NRA leader Chuck Cunningham, who was
apparently present at the proceedings. Id. at 59.
88. Id. at 60. Mr. Watts's amendment would have allowed for civil actions
against distributors, dealers and importers of firearms. Id. at 63-64. Ranking
member Mr. Cannon referred to the reading of the minority proposals as a
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entirety to the committee." Mr. Sensenbrenner, the Chairman,
was "apparently angered" at the request.9 After the amendment
was voted down he cut short the proposal of a second minority
amendment,92 and nearly a dozen more that were pending, by
prematurely moving for the previous question concerning the
adoption of House Bill 1036. 9' The ayes carried it,94 and the
hearing thereafter degenerated into a heated exchange that was
finally cut short by Mr. Sensenbrenner's snide dismissal.99
This superficial treatment of PoLCAA is all the more
remarkable given the weight of the accusations leveled against the
bill by the members of the minority.' Mr. Watts expressed deep
concern over the inadequacy97 of the hearings, and made unrefuted
accusations that the bill was being "pushed and rushed"99 through
markup for political reasons-namely, to pass the legislation
before the NRA's national convention, which was to take place in
three weeks' time.' He found particularly questionable PoLCAA's
first finding of fact: "Citizens have a right, protected by the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution, to keep and bear
arms."0 ° Mr. Watts reminded the subcommittee that the Supreme
He characterized
Court' had ruled against this interpretation.'
his majority colleagues as living in a "political dream world""3 in
which, to service the interests of the NRA, they were rushing to
pass sweeping legislation, regardless of its substantive merits,
without sufficient thought or research."° This lack of meritorious
research and debate brings the validity of PoLCAA into question.
2.

The House Report

The highly partisan nature of House Bill 1036's hearing is
reflected in the official house report, which is a collage of trivia,
"charade". Id. at 61.

89. Id. at 98.
90. Id. at 97-98.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 98. The amendment was sponsored by minority member Jackson

Lee. Id. at 98 n.2.
93. Id. at 95.
94. Id. at 96. The vote count was twenty-one to eleven. Id.

95. Id.

Chairman Sensenbrenner cut off Ms. Jackson Lee's repeated

accusation that the committee was a "disgrace" with a suggestion that she

hand in her resignation if she wished to resign. Id. at 95-96.
96. See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
97. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 57.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.; S. 659, 108th Cong. § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. II.
101. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-82 (1939).
102. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 57.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 58.
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half-truths," 5 and unsupported conclusions." To begin with, the
entire document is a hand-me-down from previous incarnations of
House Bill 1036,'°7 some of which were substantially different from
Most notably, it is padded with
the bill in its final form."
statistics to the affect that guns save millions of citizens from
crimes every year, minorities being particularly fortunate in this
These statistics are taken directly from studies
regard."'
conducted by John R. Lott, Jr., Gary Kleck, and Marc Gertz,"' and
are often quoted by the gun lobby.1 ' Re-examination of these
authors' various studies by researchers, however, has proven them
to be tainted by substantial flaws,' yielding results that are
"dubious at best""3 and at times "grossly over-estimated.""..
The house report buttresses its conclusions with multiple
references to citizens' Second Amendment rights,"' disregarding
both the Supreme Court's contrary decision in United States v.
Miller"' and Miller's progeny."'
The report also touts the fact that most state legislatures and
courts have found the relationship between manufacturers and
105. See infra note 183 (noting the inaccurate comparison of PoLCAA to the
airline industry immunity granted under The Federal Aviation Act).
106. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 10. The report claims that city suits "invite
courts to dramatically break from bedrock principles of tort law...." Id. But
the public nuisance suit is centuries old, and is commonly brought by cities
against industries which endanger the public by entirely legal activities.
Antolini, supra note 56, at 767-71. An argument that that PoLCAA itself is
the true "break from bedrock principles of tort law" can be found at The Brady
Center to Prevent Gun Violence, H.R. 1036/S. 659 Is Dangerous to Our
Nation's Health, at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/immunity/hr1036.php (last
visited May 24, 2005).
107. See H.R. 123, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1966, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.
2037, 107th Cong. (2001) (all being prior firearm industry exemption
incarnations). House Bill 2037 was scuttled after the sniper killings in
Washington, D.C. in 2003. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 98. See generally H.R.
REP. No. 108-59; H.R. REP. No. 107-727 (2002), (revealing the nearly identical
contents of H.R. 2037 House Report).
108. Chairman Sensenbrenner referred to House Bill 2037 as a
"bureaucratic Rube Goldberg device". H.R. REP. No. 107-727, pt. 2, at 50.
109. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 26-27.
110. Id. at 26 nn.176-77.
111. See Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 75-81 (debunking the statistics promoted
by the NRA).
112. Id. at 78.
113. Id. at 79.
114. See id. at 80-81 (explaining how one such self-reporting survey claimed
improbably that twice as many assailants were wounded in 1992 as the entire
number of people treated at hospitals for gunshot wounds in 1994). See also
DIAZ, supra note 6, at 160-62 (explaining away the "self-defense mirage").
115. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 83-88.
116. 307 U.S. at 178-182; H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 27-28, 102. The Court
recently reaffirmed Miller by refusing to disturb a similar Ninth Circuit ruling
in Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
117. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 82-90.
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This is a

particularly strange inclusion, given that the overall thrust of the
report is that the state legislatures and courts are incapable of
rationally addressing the
issue of gun industry liability, and must
19
therefore be preempted.

Lastly, the report supplies an unlikely doomsday scenario
wherein courts find themselves "hurdling [sic] down the slippery
slope" 2 ' toward a well-nigh universal liability, in which the
manufacturers of properly-functioning goods like automobiles and
knives are held liable for unforeseeable misuse of their products.
This prediction fails on two levels. First, it again assumes that
state judiciaries are either blind to the dangers of unchecked
liability, or are incapable of limiting such excesses. Second, it
blithely ignores the fact that neither automobile nor knife
manufacturers-unlike gun manufacturers-are
statutorily
122
exempt from negligent entrustment claims.
Taken as a whole, the legislative fact-finding supporting
House Bill 1036 is remarkably thin. The hearing was rushed,"
the markup was abridged,1" and the ensuing report is a crazy-quilt
of NRA propaganda and contradictory claims which give the
impression that state courts are at once both highly discerning and
utterly helpless," that no one benefits from loose gun regulations
so much as poor minorities, 6 and that the only way to preserve
the separation of powers is to preempt the common law of all fifty
states. 127

This mish-mash of bad data and opaque reasoning has

yielded a "political dream world"" if there ever was one, and one
which the House did its best to make a reality.

118. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 5, 8-9. See also id. at 16 n.108 (listing states
that have preempted handgun liability actions).
119. Id. at 18-19, 22-24.
120. Id. at 10, 22.
121. Id. at 10.
122. Eggen & Culhane, supra note 9, at 130. Consider also the following
scenario: a manufacturer of box-cutters gets a call from a Saudi dealer, who
requests two dozen specially made box-cutters with plastic blades and handles
in an x-ray resistant case. The last such order to this dealer supplied the tools
for the 9/11 catastrophe. The manufacturer agrees. Is he liable for the
ensuing disaster? Assuming there is no National Box-cutter Association, the
answer could well be yes.
123. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 97.
124. Id. at 97-98.
125. Id. at 19, 22-24.
126. Id. at 27.
127. Id. at 17-19.
128. Id. at 57.
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C. Substantive Defects:' Violating the Letter and
Spirit of the Tenth Amendment
PoLCAA derived its purpose from the Commerce
Clause" its scope from the Necessary and Proper Clause,..
and its power from the Supremacy Clause."2 In McCulloch v.
Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall summed up the aggregate
effect of all three:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
with the
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
133
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
The legislators' professed "end" in creating PoLCAA-to
protect the gun trade from frivolous lawsuits" -was valid under
the Commerce Clause."' But the "means"-exempting an entire
industry from liability by a generally applicable prohibition-were
Such legislation would have subverted the Tenth
not."3
T

129. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, the Court held that
the Tenth Amendment's reservation of unenumerated sovereign powers to the
several states does not substantively limit or restrain congressional powers
under the Commerce Clause. 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985). Rather, the Court
explained, any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause
power must derive from "failings in the national political process" that deprive
the states from asserting and protecting their sovereign authority. Id. This
view was quickly discarded, however, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 157 (1992), where the Court held that congressional Commerce Clause
power is substantively precluded from infringing upon state sovereigntysovereignty that is negatively defined by the limitations on federal power as
set out in Article I. See also Peter A. Lauricella, Comment, The Real "Contract
with America" The Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377, 1386-89 (1997) (describing the
Court's changing view on substantive restraints on Commerce Clause power).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
132. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
133. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
134. See 149 CONG. REC. S3996, S3998 (2003) (statement of Sen. Craig)
(introducing Senate Bill 659, PoLCAA, as a bill "solely directed at stopping
frivolous, politically-driven litigation against law-abiding individuals for the
misbehavior of criminals over whom they had no control").
135. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (stating that Congress, through the
Commerce Clause, has the power to regulate the uses of channels of interstate
commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and matters having a
substantial affect on interstate commerce).
136. The current Court has held that both the scope of the Necessary and
Proper Clause and the power of the Supremacy Clause are dependent upon
the constitutionality of their application in light of the principles of federalism.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920-25 (1997).
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Amendment 37 by impinging upon the concurrent sovereignty of the
states as conceived by the framers and recognized by the current
Court." The Court's recent affirmation of the federalist principles
embodied in the Tenth Amendment is anathema to retroactive
exemptions like PoLCAA, which would, if passed into law,
excessively interfere with state governments' ability to function.
1.

The Return of Federalism

For most of the past century, the states' Tenth Amendment
powers receded before the ever-expanding scope of the Commerce
Clause. 9 Under the combined aegis of the Commerce and the
Necessary and Proper Clauses, Congress was able to effect
substantial social change, legitimizing among other things a
national minimum wage. 4"
But in doing so, the federal
government encroached greatly upon state powers, and essentially
reduced the Tenth Amendment to "a truism."'
It was not until
recently that the Supreme
Court
began
reining
in
the scope of the
4
Commerce Clause. '
This sea change first occurred in 1976 in National League of
Cities v. Usery,'
where the Court held that the federal
government could not usurp a traditional government function of a
137. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also Garcia,469 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (quoting John Marshall as saying: "The spirit of the Tenth
Amendment, of course, is that the States will retain their integrity in a system
in which the laws of the United States are nevertheless supreme'"). State
"integrity" arises from the concept of concurrent sovereignty, which is an
inviolable precept of our system of government. New York, 505 U.S. at 162-63.
See also id. at 188, (quoting James Madison in The FederalistNo. 39 as saying
that the Constitution "'leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty'").
138. Alexander Hamilton said: "When a '[1]aw... for carrying into
Execution' the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty...'
it is.. . 'merely [an] act of usurpation' which 'deserve[s] to be treated as such."
THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). He was quoted in Printz, 521
U.S. at 923-24. The concept of concurrent state and federal sovereignty, the
Court explains, provides an unprecedented "double security" to the citizens of
the United States. Id. at 920, 922. It protects both state and federal
government from incursion by each other and allows for each to have a "direct
relationship" with "the people who sustain it and are governed by it." Id. at
920. See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (quoting Madison
on the "double security" provided by state sovereignty).
139. John D. Tortorella, Note, Reining in the Tenth Amendment: Finding a
Principled Limit to the Non-Commandeering Doctrine of United States v.
Printz, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1365, 1365-66 (1998).
140. Garcia,469 U.S. at 555-56.
141. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
142. See Tortorella, supra note 139, at 1369-77 (providing a brief summary of
federalism).
143. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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state.' 4 Although this traditional test was abandoned nine years
later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority,'5 the idea
of an inviolable state sovereignty persisted in Justices O'Connor's
and Powell's dissents in FERC v. Mississippi' 6 and Garcia,'7 and
finally re-emerged in the majority's ruling in New York v. United
States." In 1994 the Court held in New York that while the
federal government could directly regulate private citizens, it
This noncould not commandeer state legislatures to do so.'
commandeering principle was confirmed and expanded in Printz v.
United States to protect state executive officers, as well as state
legislatures, from federal regulation.''
The resulting doctrine bans federal regulatory schemes that
impress state officials,"' but tolerates federal laws of general
applicability-i.e., those that regulate both private and public
actors alike."'

144. Under the traditional government functions test the federal government
had no power to regulate the states as states-that is, in the states' capacity to
regulate themselves in areas of traditional government functions. Id. at 84552. In FERC v. Mississippi, Justice O'Connor wrote that the federalist
principles protected by the balancing test were accountability, efficiency,
innovation, encouragement of participation in government at the local level,
and freedom from tyranny. 456 U.S. 742, 787-91 (1982) (O'Connor, J.
concurring).
145. The Garciamajority struck down the traditional functions test because
the amorphous standard had resulted in contradictory rulings. 469 U.S. at
538-39. Justice Powell, in his dissent, said that by abandoning the balancing
test the majority decision "effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric...." Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
146. 456 U.S. at 775-95.
147. 469 U.S. at 557-89.
148. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act, which required non-compliant states to take title to the
radioactive waste they produced, commandeered state legislatures and was
thus unconstitutional).

149. Id.
150. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-35 (holding that the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act, by requiring state sheriffs to run background checks
on potential handgun purchasers, commandeered state executive officers and
was thus unconstitutional).
151. New York, 505 U.S. at 188. The Court explained that no matter how
important Congress' reasons were, "the Constitution simply does not give
Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. The Constitution
instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to preempt contrary state regulation." Id. at 178. The Court suggested that
Congress could encourage a state to comply with a regulation by offering
financial incentives, but could not coerce it to do so. Id. at 167-68.
152. In New York, the Court chose not to revisit cases holding that its noncommandeering doctrine does not apply when the act in question affects both
private and public parties. 505 U.S. at 160 (citing FERC, 456 U.S. at 758-59).
But the New York majority also admitted that recent Court rulings concerning
generally applicable laws that affect the authority of state governments have
"traveled an unsteady path." Id.
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But do firearm industry retroactive exemptions like PoLCAA
regulate private and public actors alike? I submit that, while
ostensibly
a
precedent-friendly
prohibition
of
general
applicability,"u PoLCAA as drafted was actually neither consistent
with precedent nor generally applicable.1" And even if it could
have been construed as such, it was nonetheless specifically
designed to curtail and destroy the exclusive powers of state
executive officers."
Such excessive interference with state
government is both dangerous and unconstitutional, and was fully
predicted in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Garcia." Should
PoLCAA--or any similar act-be made into law, the enactment
should trigger a balancing test set forth in Printz to weigh the
Act's purpose against its interference with state government, and
its efficiency against its imposed administrative burden.'57
2. PastProhibitions:PoLCAA Distinguished
The Tenth Amendment protects states from both overbroad
federal prohibitions and regulatory schemes." The Court has held
recently that "even where Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit
those acts." 59
The
Supreme
Court,
however,
has
upheld
the
constitutionality of prohibitions in the past in cases such as Reno
v. Condon," South Carolinav. Baker, 6' Fry v. United States,1 62 and
Maryland v. Wirtz." But these are variously distinguishable from
PoLCAA as acts of limited intrusion"' that were subject to
exception," and created in times of national emergency." They

153. S. 659, 108th Cong. § 4. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 11.
154. See infra Part III.C.2.
155. The Act was primarily created to retroactively invalidate the city suits
brought against the gun industry since 1998. Loiacono, supra note 21, at 11.

156. 469 U.S. at 588.
157. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.

158. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
159. Id.
160. 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2002) (upholding the Driver's Privacy Protection Act

of 1994, which prohibited a state from selling personal information collected
from citizens applying for drivers licenses).

161. 485 U.S. 505, 527 (1988) (upholding Congress' power to prohibit states
from issuing unregistered bonds).
162. 421

U.S. 542, 548 (1975) (upholding injunction to prevent Ohio from

paying wage and salary increases in excess of that mandated by the Economic
Stabilization Act).
163. 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act).

164. The Court noted in Fry that the federal regulation was limited in
application, not a "drastic invasion of state sovereignty," and that the
regulation in Wirtz had been even less intrusive. Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.6.
165. An example of this would be Congress' exception of the working poor,
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also mainly regulated the states' collection and dispersal of
167
revenue.
Not so with PoLCAA.
PoLCAA would have deeply and
permanently intruded upon the states' sovereignty by
undercutting their ability to defend their citizens from harm and
maintain a viable common law system." The Act contained no
exceptions for any conduct that was not already protected under
criminal or contract common law." 9 Further, while the NRA
claimed that a national emergency existed, such was manifestly
not the case. 17 ° Finally, PoLCAA was vastly different in scope from
these or other exemptions..' because it sacrificed the established
who would be allowed to continue to receive wage increases despite the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Id.
166. Id. at 548.
167. Both the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216, and the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (repealed
1974), were enacted to counteract inflation. The Driver's Privacy Protection
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721, and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982), were enacted to rein in states' unacceptable
means of generating revenue. PoLCAA, which is meant to prevent injunctive
as well as compensatory remedies, falls outside the scope of these cases.
168. See Morrison Letter, supra note 4 ("[Ilf Congress could preempt state
common law in this instance, it would seem to have no impediment to
eliminating any aspect of state tort law... without providing a federal
program or remedy to replace it.").
169. S. 659, 108th Cong. § 5(A).
170. By its own admission, the gun trade is a comparatively small industry.
See infra text accompanying note 227.
171. Congress exempts parties from liability in one of three scenarios. The
first is when a party acts in compliance with a federal regulatory scheme.
Thus, reporting agencies in compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1681-1681x, may not be held liable to consumers for defamation,
invasion of privacy or negligence, absent a showing of malice or willful intent.
See also Ronald G. Spaeth et al., Quality Assurance and Hospital Structure:
How the Physician-HospitalRelationshipAffects Quality Measures, 12 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 235, 237 (2003) (granting qualified immunity for physicians
engaging in peer review programs created by The Health Care Quality
Improvement Act); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (exempting cities that comply with
conditional storm water discharge permits issued under Clean Water Act for
third party discharges); 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) (2005) (stating that compliance
with the Federal Highway Administration Act's warning device standards
preempts state tort liability). The second type of exemption is granted to
untargeted parties that are collateral to an affirmative regulatory scheme.
Thus, persons not qualifying as "sellers" are not liable under the Securities Act
for selling securities by means of a faulty prospectus or oral communication
(and likewise persons noq qualifying as "offerors" are not liable for violative
offers). Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771. See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(b) (saying that under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, non-racketeering businesses are not liable under a theory
of respondeat superior). Lastly, Congress may carve out an exception for a
threatened subset that is part of a larger, heavily regulated group. For
example, under the Federal Aviation Act, lessors of aircraft are exempt from
both federal and state liability actions. 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b). The gun
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powers of state legislatures and chief executive officers, not for the
general benefit of the public, but to safeguard the profits of a
single, largely unregulated industry. 72'
As such, PoLCAA was distinguishable from the most current
case concerning federal prohibitions. In Reno v. Condon, the Court
found a federal prohibition to be constitutional because, although
it regulated state activities by prohibiting the sale of drivers'
personal information without their consent, Congress did not
"seek[E to control or influence the manner in which States
regulated private parties."'73 PoLCAA, by contrast, would have
allowed Congress to control and influence the manner in which the
states regulate private parties, because the Act was created for the
express purpose of stripping state chief executive officers of powers
exclusive to their office 7 -- namely, their ability to protect their
electorate by bringing public nuisance suits against the gun
industry. 1 '
The counterargument to this claim, of course, is that public
nuisance suits are not exclusive to executive officers because
private parties may file them as well, and therefore such a
prohibition might be seen as generally applicable and therefore
constitutional.'76 Unlike a public plaintiff, however, a private
party may only prevail in a public nuisance suit if he or she can
show injury that differs in kind from that of the general public.'77
The harms caused by the gun industry's irresponsible practicesdeath, injury, apprehension, loss of personal and commercial
welfare, etc.-are shared by countless others throughout the

industry is neither heavily regulated, nor collateral to a heavily regulated
group, nor a threatened subset of a heavily regulated group. Bhowmik, supra

note 2, at 68. It is the most loosely regulated industry in the United States.
Id.
172. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 103.
173. 528 U.S. at 150-51.
174. See 149 CONG. REC. S3996, S3998 (statements on Introduced Bills and

Joint Resolutions) (stating emphatically that the lawsuits that Senate Bill 659
is meant to prevent "are not brought by individuals... [but are part of] a
politically-inspired initiative trying to force social goals through an end-run
around the Congress...").

175. State officials' power to bring a public nuisance claim on behalf of their
electorate is "among the highest and most time-honored duties of executive
officials." Kairys, supra note 41, at 1173. While public nuisance suits may be

brought by mayors or governors, it is a particularly appropriate tool of
attorneys general. See Kao, supra note 47, at 226-27 (stating that attorneys
general are the "undisputed representative[s] of the public interest" in cases

concerning "the health, welfare, and safety of state residents").

Attorneys

general are thus "champions of the public interest". Robert M. McGreevey,
The Illinois Attorney General's Representation of Opposing State AgenciesConflicts of Interest, Policy and Practice,66 ILL. B.J. 308, 308 (1978).
176. Antolini, supra note 56, at 766.

177. Id.
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country. 78 No private party's injury can be unique in this context,
and therefore none are qualified to bring suit. Thus, only state
executive officers may effectively bring a public nuisance action
against the gun industry; it is an act particular to their official
capacity. 9
In this way, PoLCAA's regulation of state executives has
parallels in Printz, where the Court ruled that the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act was unconstitutional because it compelled
sheriffs to conduct background checks using certain databases and
records to which only they had access.18 ° Similarly, PoLCAA would
have regulated a vital and exclusive tool of state executive officers:
the public nuisance suit.
Such an interference with state government would also go
against the Court's statement in New York, that "[nleither
government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial
manner the exercise of its powers." 8' It is hard to imagine a more
severe curtailment of state power than an exemption like PoLCAA.
With a single stroke of the pen, the legislatures and executive
officers of fifty states and countless cities would be deprived of the
ability to seek redress from gun manufacturers for injury to the
public. 8 '
Such an industry-specific "gift basket" would be
unique," but not unforeseen.

178. See AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp.2d at 508 ("Every segment of our society
suffers the same kind of injury as a result of the criminal misuse of
firearms .... ").
179. Kairys, supra note 41, at 1173.
180. 521 U.S. at 933.
181. 505 U.S. at 163 (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523
(1926)).
182. It can be argued that executive officers of cities should be just as
exempt from federal regulation as state officers. In Printz, the Court quoted
with approval Madison's insistence that even "local or municipal
authorities ... [are] no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the
general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere." Printz, 521 U.S. at 920-21 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James
Madison)).
183. Never before has a federal prohibition of general applicability absolved
an entire industry of civil liability. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 103. The H.R.
1036 House Report tries to draw a comparison to the federal government's
exemption of the aviation industry from liability. Id. at 11. This gross
misrepresentation glosses over the fact that the aviation industry is "one of
the most intensely regulated industries in the United States". Patrick J. Shea,
Solving America's General Aviation Crisis: The Advantages of Federal
Preemption over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 749 (1995). Congress
has preempted the aviation field so as to affirmatively promulgate safety
rules, inspect and certify aircraft, certify pilots, regulate owners, operate air
traffic functions, and investigate domestic aviation accidents. Id. at 751.
PoLCAA has taken no such measures.
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PoLCAA Predicted

Justice Powell, in his dissent in Garcia, pointed out that in
abandoning the traditional functions test, the majority had
provided no standard to determine when the national political
process had malfunctioned."s Henceforth, Justice O'Connor added,
all that stood between state sovereignty and Congress "is the
latter's underdeveloped capacity for self restraint.""s Specifically,
Justice Powell warned of
[tihe rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in
sophisticated
lobbying, and make substantial campaign
contributions to some Members of Congress. These groups are
thought to have significant influence in the shaping and enactment
[A] "political process" that
of certain types of legislation ....
functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the sovereign rights of
States and localities.1 6
Should an act like PoLCAA be passed into law, the political
process will have indeed failed, and so selectively will it have
failed-resulting in legislation that specifically targets the states
left that have not exempted the gun industry from liability-that
the Act should qualify as a true political malfunction: one in which
states are "singled out in a way that [leaves them] politically
isolated and powerless." 87
Should a similar act be passed into law in the future, it must
either be amended in such a way as to cure its defects, or be
judged by new criteria that would properly weigh its (de)merits.1'
To do otherwise would be to allow the creation of a regulatory void
that defies precedent,"9 undermines the separation of powers,"
184. 469 U.S. at 564 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

186. Id. at 576 (Powell, J., dissenting). Rehnquist concluded his dissent by
saying that he was confident that a "balancing test" would someday "command
the support of a majority of this Court" once again. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting).
187. Baker, 485 U.S. at 512-13.
188. See infra Part IV.A.
189. Supra Part III.C. While facially a mere prohibition, PoLCAA deviates
from past prohibitions because it erases important and long-held executive
remedies to benefit a single industry. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 103. As farreaching as a regulatory scheme, PoLCAA nevertheless provides no new

system of governance to replace what it has demolished. Morrison Letter,
supra note 4, at 3. PoLCAA has in effect exploited a loophole left open in New
York and Printz by making a simple prohibition do the work of a major

regulatory scheme. It thus facially complies with the Court's ruling in New
York and Printz, while in fact turning the non-commandeering doctrine on its
head. If allowed to stand, the exception will devour the rule, and PoLCAA will
have created a regulatory void that is entirely unprecedented. H.R. REP. NO.
108-59, at 103.

190. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 922 ("The power of the Federal Government
would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service-
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and reduces the Tenth Amendment to a truism. 19

IV. BALANCING TEST OR BIGGER BUDGET
Even if a firearm industry retroactive exemption like PoLCAA
qualifies as generally applicable, its unique structure and scope
would nonetheless trigger a balancing test to weigh the act's
purpose against its violation of Tenth Amendment principles, and
its efficiency against its administrative burden. Barring such a
test, the best hope for making the act constitutional would be to
amend it so as to greatly increase the regulatory powers of the
ATF.
A. The Return of the Balancing Test
Toward the end of the majority's opinion in Printz, the Court
addressed the federal government's plea that the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act"9 be ruled constitutional because it
"serves very important purposes, is most efficiently administered
by [chief law enforcement officers] ... and places a minimal and
only temporary burden upon state officers." 93 In response, the
Court stated that "[a] ssuming all the mentioned factors were true,
they might be relevant if we were evaluating whether the
incidental application to the States of a federal law of general
applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of state
governments."" The Court went on to say that such was not the
case with the Brady Act. 95
PoLCAA, however, is not the Brady Act. It is the perfect
embodiment of the Court's hypothetical, which, if rephrased,
would run thus:
When a federal law of general applicability, by incidental
application to the states, interferes excessively with the functioning
of state government, then the Court, in determining the act's
constitutionality, may consider the importance of the act's purpose,
the efficiency of its administration, and the nature of the burden
imposed on state officers."96
PoLCAA would qualify under the test.

It is (ostensibly) a

and at no cost to itself-the [executive officers] of the 50 States."). See also

H.R. REP. No. 107-727, pt. 2, at 88-89 (statement of Mr. Frank) (stating that
the proposed amendment is the "nail in the coffin" of state power, and
suggesting that the Act be renamed the "Decent Burial for the Doctrine of
States' Rights Act").
191. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
192. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-931.
193. Printz, 521 U.S. at 931-32.
194. Id. at 932.
195. Id.
196. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:955

federal law of general applicability. 197 It also would "incidentally"
deprive state officers, such as the governors and attorneys general
of all fifty states, of the right to bring negligence or public
nuisance claims against the gun industry on behalf of the public. 98
This would be an excessive interference with the states' ability to
function. U.S. cities are drowning in a sea of guns." The death
toll is unconscionable, 0° the benefit to the drug trade is
immeasurable, 0 ' and the annual cost of extra policing,
hospitalization, and loss of work, is staggering."' To prevent state
executive officers, as elected champions of the people, from
recouping some of the public's monetary losses while saving
thousands of lives in the process, would be an act of unthinkable
shortsightedness and should qualify as excessive interference.
If, then, PoLCAA qualifies as a federal prohibition of general
application that excessively interferes with state government, we
should then weigh its purpose against its violation of the Tenth
Amendment, and its efficiency against the imposed administrative
burden.2"
PoLCAA's primary purpose was to spare the gun industry
Such suits, the legislators stated, as
from frivolous lawsuits.2
might be allowed by a "maverick judicial officer or petit jury,"0 5
could bankrupt the gun industry and do damage to the public's
Second Amendment rights.2" But no such public nuisance suit has
197. The Act applies to all "persons," persons being defined as "any

individual, corporation, company, association.., or any other entity, including
any governmental entity." S.659, 108th Cong. § 4(3).
198. Id. § 3(a).

199. On average, there are over 400,000 violent gun crimes per year.
AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUNDATION, THE ENFORCEMENT GAP: FEDERAL
STRATEGY NEGLECTS SOURCES OF CRIME GUNS 53 (2004), available at

http://www.agsfoundation.com/media/AGS-enf.pdf (last visited May 25, 2005).
200. Siebel, supra note 22, at 410.
201. DIAZ, supra note 6, at 108, 131.
202. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 72. See also Cook et al., supra note 11, at
347 (quoting one estimate that puts the damage at $80 billion per year).
203. Printz, 521 U.S. at 931-32.
204. See S.659, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(6), (b)(1) (stating that the city suits are

"based on theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common
law" such as could only be sustained by a "maverick judicial officer"). See
supra text accompanying note 134 (discussing the purpose behind Senate Bill

659).
205. S.659, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(6).
206. The gun industry's defense costs are unarguably high. See BROWN &

ABEL, supra note 6, at 160 (quoting Colt's legal fees as $100,000 per week at
one point). See id. at 157-59 (describing the bankrupting of the California

"Saturday Night Special" manufacturers, and the role played by then
Governor Gray Davis). The biggest company to go bankrupt, however, is
Smith & Wesson. See id. at 205-30, 298-99 (outlining the provisions of the

Smith & Wesson settlement, and its aftermath). Following the settlement, the
NRA initiated a ferocious retaliatory campaign against the manufacturer that
inspired spare, slander, death threats, and a ruinous boycott. Id. at 214-16,
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ever been ruled frivolous."'
This lack of foundation is particularly egregious when
compared with the Act's violation of the Tenth Amendment.208 The
extent to which PoLCAA would violate the Tenth Amendment,
which is a prime textual source for the principles of federalism,"
can be measured by the Act's conflict with the federalist principles
themselves. These principles have been set forth by Justice
O'Connor as accountability, innovation, democracy, freedom from
tyranny, and efficiency.2 10
PoLCAA's violation of these principles is manifest. The Act
would undercut the accountability of state officials by eviscerating
their ability to protect their electorate from the gun industry's
irresponsible marketing and design practices.2 1' It would squelch
innovation by preventing state legislatures from coming up with
original solutions to their state's unique challenges.212 It would
stifle democracy because, faced with the greatly reduced power of
state and municipal government, citizens are dissuaded from
participating in any sort of local political process on the legitimate
grounds that such participation seems largely meaningless. 2

226, 299.

This incident belies the NRA's supposed fear of industry-wide

bankruptcy; clearly, state executive officers should not be penalized for the
NRA's practice of cannibalizing its own.
207. Of the thirty-plus city and state suits that have been brought, not one
has been deemed frivolous by the courts. H.R. REP. No. 107-727, pt. 1, at 11.
208. See supra Part III.C (discussing how PoLCAA violates the Tenth
Amendment).
209. Printz, 521 U.S. at 924 n.13.
210. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 787-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
211. See id. at 787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Congressional compulsion of
state agencies ... blurs the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens
feeling that their representatives are no longer responsive to local needs.").
See also New York, 505 U.S. at 168 ("Where Congress encourages state
regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to
the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain accountable to the
people."). The Court in New York goes on to explain that, because state
officials may "bear the brunt of public disapproval" for enforcing unpopular
laws, accountability is diminished when officials are compelled to enforce laws
not in accordance with their electorate's beliefs and not preempted by federal
regulation. Id. at 169. Obviously such regulation must be constitutional for
the Supremacy Clause to take effect. Printz, 521 U.S. at 924-25.
212. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that
state innovation contributes to valuable new "social, economic, and political
ideas" such as minimum wage laws, the vote for women, and no-fault
automobile insurance). See also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 n.13 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that federal preemption in no way encourages state
innovation).
213. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 790 n.28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
IGNAZIO SILONE, THE SCHOOL FOR DICTATORS 119 (William Weaver trans.
1963) (1938): "When democracy, driven by some of its baser tendencies,
suppresses [local institutions], it is only devouring itself."). See also Garcia,
469 U.S. at 571 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining that state sovereignty
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Most importantly, PoLCAA would subvert the states' ability to
combat tyranny by setting a precedent whereby the states are
merely unwitting pawns of the federal government, which is all too
frequently a pawn of industry. 14 Weighing PoLCAA's merits
against its violation of the Tenth Amendment can only reveal a
gross imbalance.
Finally, we must compare PoLCAA's efficiency to its
administrative burden. Even if the threat of frivolous lawsuits
were legitimate, the blanket prohibition is overbroad; it would not
be an efficient solution to bar high-ranking state officials from
bringing such suits. The number of attorneys general is not
large;215 the number of those whose legislatures would allow them
to bring suit is smaller;21 the number of those who would then do
so is smaller still."7 Furthermore, attorneys general are dutybound to protect their electorate, and their actions are closely
scrutinized." 8 To bar such state officers from bringing public
nuisance suits because they might do so frivolously would be both
unrealistic and shortsighted.219 It would assume that either gun
manufacturers never create public nuisances and never will, or
alternately that such abuses do and will take place, but the gun
industry's financial well-being outweighs the public's need for a
remedy. Recent industry and state disclosures about the actual
financial losses involved reveal these assumptions to be baseless." °
should be respected because it is the states that "attract and retain the loyalty
of their citizens"). Powell's dissent also states that local participation in the
political process is more effective, frequent, and closer to the democratic ideal
than that occurring on a national scale. Id. at 576 n.18.
214. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (saying the "States are not mere political

subdivisions of the United States"). The Court admonishes us to resist "the
temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the
crisis of the day." Id. at 187. See also JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE ESSENTIALS
OF JOHN GALBRAITH 132, 141, 150 (2001) (describing the heavy influence of
industry on the federal government).

215. Each state has one attorney general.
216. Twenty-three states have granted gun manufacturers immunity from
civil suits. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 94 n.96.
217. In the six years since the city suits began, only one attorney general,

New York's Eliot Spitzer, has chosen to bring a suit against the gun industry.
BROWN & ABEL, supra note 6, at 180.
218. See id. at 180-85, 230-31 (revealing the careful deliberation preceding

the public nuisance suit brought against the gun industry by New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer).
219. See Kao, supra note 47, at 225-27 (explaining why, under the parens

patriae doctrine, states have an inherent duty to protect their citizens). This
also applies to municipal officials. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
of Camden County v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984)

([A] municipality is merely a political subdivision of the State from which its
authority derives.").

220. An unending stream of ATF traces provides the gun industry with
notice that their oversaturation techniques are systematically exploited by
certain dealers to put guns in the hands of criminals. BROWN & ABEL, supra
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Even if the gun industry were vulnerable to frivolous lawsuits,"'
stripping state executive officers of their common law powers
would be a highly inefficient solution.
Besides being inefficient, PoLCAA would impose a heavy
administrative burden. On its face, the Act seems to impose no
burden on state officers because it does not force them to comply
with a regulatory scheme.222 But the removal of vital and longheld executive powers would not lighten the burden on a state
officer.'
The officers' duty is to promote the welfare of their
electorate, so to remove a means by which the officers can effect
that duty would be in fact a heavy imposition, because it would
increase the threat of future industry abuses while reducing the
officers' ability to curb the same." ' The idea that PoLCAA imposes
note 6, at 164. This notice has been acknowledged by gun executives. Id. at

140. The absurdity of giving gun industry lawsuit expenses more weight than

state firearm expenses can be seen by the fact that one estimate of the annual
damage to the United States ($20 billion) is more than thirteen times larger
than the gun industry's (self-reported) annual gross income. Bhowmik, supra
note 2, at 72; H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 11.
221. The gun industry grosses $1.5 billion per year, as compared to the
tobacco industry at $45 billion. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 11.
222. This is, in fact, the problem. See supra text accompanying note 76
(stating the danger of a broad preemptive prohibitions).
223. The public has a right to live in health, safety, and peace. Kao, supra
note 47, at 216. The government's duty to safeguard this right has been
continually reaffirmed by gun rights advocates who argue for less litigation
and more enforcement of existing gun laws. See AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY
FOUNDATION, supra note 199, at 66 (stating the purpose of the foundation).
And yet the ability of the federal government to do so is being continually
undermined by special interest groups. In August of 2003 the NRA backed a
"brazen" bill which, if passed into law, would seriously undermine the ATF's
power to detect and prosecute illegal gun trafficking. Dick Dahl, NRA Seeks to
Undercut BATF Powers, at http'//www.jointogether.org/gv/news/features/
reader/0,2061,566162,00.html (Aug. 8, 2003).
The ATF's job has been
rendered even more difficult by former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft,
who severely checked the ATF's ability to use Brady Act background check
records in investigations, and reversed the DOJ's longstanding Second
Amendment policy. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 99-104; BROWN & ABEL, supra
note 6, at 292-96. With the federal government's ability to enforce federal
firearms statutes in continual flux, the burden falls upon state government
officials to take whatever measures they can to protect their electorate, to
whom they are ultimately accountable.
New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
"Accountability is... diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state
officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in
matters not preempted by federal regulation." Id. The "preemption" referred
to here by the Court is narrowly conceived of as a federal regulatory scheme
that the state may choose to forgo, in which case it will be enforced by the
federal government. Id. at 161. There are two elements here-state choice
and federal proactive measures-that are missing from PoLCAA. The act is a
coercive curtailment of state powers that takes much and gives nothing back.
Id. at 162. It does not relieve a state's burden; it increases it.
224. In fact, the damage that PoLCAA would inflict upon state autonomy is
far more egregious because of the precedent it would set. If the gun industry
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a light burden, or no burden, merely because it is a prohibition, is

illusory.2 5

However important the purpose of protecting the gun
industry from frivolous lawsuits-a danger as of yet
unmanifested 2 6-- the solution of barring state officials from
bringing such suits is both inefficient and burdensome. PoLCAA
would therefore fail under the balancing test suggested in Printz.
B. Increasingthe Regulatory Powers of the ATF
Law, like nature, abhors a vacuum.2 7 If passed, an exemption
like PoLCAA will create a regulatory vacuum wherein the most
irresponsible practices of the firearm industry can thrive
unchecked. 8 The best way to counterbalance the states' loss of
power in such a situation would be to greatly increase the ATF's
funding and regulatory powers so that the agency can conduct
more frequent and rigorous investigations of federal firearms
The ATF could also be granted powers to ban,
violations."
monitor, and set standards for gun industry products. 3 ° Such a
preemption would then efficiently and constitutionally relieve the
states of a burden which they may no longer legally shoulder.
V. THE RETURN OF THE GREAT AND RADICAL VICE

PoLCAA was and is a valentine to America's most dangerous
trade.23' The fierce lobbying of the NRA threatens to create an act
can win blanket civil immunity for itself, what is to keep the pharmaceutical
industry from doing the same thing? Or the auto industry? PoLCAA opens
the door to the frightening prospect of endless partisan hearings, backroom
deals, and a "blue light special" on civil immunities.
225. By way of an analogy, no one would claim that a prohibition that
banned state executive officers from using their telephones at work was not a
heavy burden simply because it did not proscribe affirmative acts.
226. See supra text accompanying note 208.
227. "Nature abhors a vacuum."

BENEDICT SPINOZA, ETHICS, Part I,

Proposition 15: note (1677).
228. See supra text accompanying note 169.
229. An increase in ATF funding and regulatory power is needed regardless
of PoLCAA's fate. Federal gun crimes are rarely enforced or prosecuted. See
generally AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUNDATION, supra note 199. Corrupt

FFLs were very rarely prosecuted, although they were by far the biggest
source of illegally trafficked guns. Id. at 4. Of the twenty-two federal gun
statutes, eighty-seven percent of prosecutions were brought under two
statutes, while the other twenty went virtually ignored. Id. at 2. Only 0.2% of
the 12,406 (24 or 25) federal gun prosecutions in 2003 were for illegally selling
firearms to a minor, despite the fact that juveniles committed an estimated
106,000 violent gun crimes between 2000 and 2002. Id. at 4, 11, 53. For every
1,000 stolen firearms that authorities recover, there are only 5 federal
prosecutions. Id. at 38.
230. DIAZ, supra note 6, at 200-06.
231. Chairman Sensenbrenner used the same metaphor at the House
Committee Markup in reference to ranking member John Conyers' facetious
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with a deficient legislative record and a hybrid structure which
defies precedent, goes against the holdings of the current Court,
and is nemesis to the future of state sovereignty."2 It would also
force an issue that was predicted in Garcia" and acknowledged in
Printz:2 4 that a law of general applicability that excessively
interferes with the operations of state government may call for a
balancing test to determine its constitutionality. 235 The application
of such a test would reveal the most glaring shortcomings of a
firearm industry retroactive exemption, which, if unaltered so as
to further empower the regulatory capabilities of the ATF, will
unleash the newest incarnation of the "great and radical vice": 6
"LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their
CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as " contra7
distinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist. 2

suggestion that PoLCAA be expanded to exempt all gun users as well as
manufacturers. H.R. REP. No. 108-59, at 59.
232. See supra Part III.
233. 469 U.S. at 576-80 (Powell, J., dissenting).
234. 521 U.S. at 932.
235. Id. at 931-32.
236. New York, 505 U.S. at 163 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
237. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton)).

